IIPF Young Economists Award

The "IIPF Young Economists Award" was instituted in 2008, with the aim of encouraging young scholars who present their papers at the IIPF annual congress. A Prize Committee, headed by the Scientific Chair of the respective congress, selects those papers presented at the congress that stand out for their scientific quality, creativity and relevance, and chooses up to three of them to be distinguished with this award.

The same rules apply for this award as for the "Peggy and Richard Musgrave Prize", namely that authors must be under 40 years old, that in the case of co-authored papers, all authors need to be under 40, and that age is measured as at the ending day of the Congress, when the prize is awarded. Authors who wish to be considered for this award should indicate this when submitting their papers for presentation at the Congress.

The 2011 IIPF Young Economists Award went to

Raphael Parchet and Beatrix Brügger, both from the University of Lausanne, for their paper Culture and Taxes: Towards Identifying Tax Competition
Craig Garthwaite, Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, for his paper The Doctor Might See You Now: The Supply-Side Effects of Public Health Insurance Expansions
Aart Gerritsen, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute, for his paper Equity and Efficiency in Rationed Labor Markets

 

Previous IIPF Young Economists Award Laureates

Year	Author(s)	Title of Paper
2010	Johannes Rincke & Ferdinand Mittermaier	Do Countries Compensate Firms for International Wage Differentials?
2009	Ronald Davies & Johannes Voget	Tax Competition in an Expanding European Union
	José Carlos Assi Kimou	Economic Conditions, Enforcement and Criminal Activities in the District of Abidjan
	Martial Foucault, Emilie Caldeira & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi	Public Spending Interactions among Beninese Municipalities
2008	Johannes Becker & Nadine Riedel	Corporate Taxation and Multinational Firms - Empirical Evidence on Welfare Implications
	T.Scott Findley & Frank N. Caliendo	Short Horizons, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Social Security
	Gabrielle Fack & Camille Landais	Are Fiscal Incentives Towards Charitable Giving Efficient: Evidence from France